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The presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial lie at the core 
of the United States justice system.  While existing rules and practices serve 
to uphold these principles, the administration of justice is significantly 
compromised by a covert but influential factor: namely, implicit racial 
biases.  These biases can lead to automatic associations between race and 
guilt, as well as impact the way in which judges and jurors interpret 
information throughout a trial.  Despite the well-documented presence of 
implicit racial biases, few steps have been taken to ameliorate the problem in 
the courtroom setting.  This Article discusses the potential of virtual reality 
to reduce these biases among judges and jurors.  Through analyzing the 
various ethical and legal considerations, this Article contends that 
implementing virtual reality training with judges and jurors would be 
justifiable and advisable should effective means become available.  Given 
that implicit racial biases can seriously undermine the fairness of the justice 
system, this Article ultimately asserts that unconventional debiasing methods 
warrant legitimate attention and consideration. 
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In 2011, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published 
a study1 that immediately made international headlines.  An analysis of 
parole decisions among eight judges in Israel revealed a surprising factor that 
influenced these cases’ outcomes.  While one might have expected this factor 
to involve the gravity of the crime committed or the length of time served, it 
turned out to be something completely unrelated to the defendant or the 
crime: namely, the degree to which the judge was hungry or tired.2  
Decisions to grant parole were highly correlated with a judge’s break 
schedule—judges were more likely to deny parole requests heard right before 
                                                 
1  Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889 (2011), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/17/6889.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCR9-QVVT]. 
2  Id. at 6890.  Some scholars debate the conclusions and explanatory power of 
this article.  See Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in 
the Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E833 (2011), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/42/E833.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MZL-DB59].  
However, for Danziger and colleagues’ rebuttal, see Shai Danziger et al., Reply to 
Weinshall-Margel and Shapard: Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions Persist, 
108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E834 (2011), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/42/E834.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/6393-FTC9]. 
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a break, whereas requests heard soon after a break were more likely to be 
granted.3  The results of this study prompted significant uproar, as evidenced 
by headlines such as “When Lunch is Served, So is Justice”4 and “Hungry 
Judges Dispense Rough Justice.”5  The fact that a justice system could 
involve such patently extralegal factors seemed to threaten the court’s 
legitimacy and spark doubts as to whether justice was actually being 
delivered.  
While this study is certainly interesting, its results are not nearly as 
groundbreaking or shocking as the media’s response might suggest.  The 
impact of extralegal factors in the courtroom is a well-documented 
phenomenon that can influence both judges and jurors.6  In fact, whereas 
hunger and fatigue are sensations of which individuals are consciously 
aware, opinions and decisions can also be affected by factors unbeknownst to 
judges or jurors themselves.  For example, individuals’ attractiveness, 
demeanor, and clothing can all play a role in our perceptions of their 
credibility and innocence.7  Moreover, implicit reactions, such as racial 
biases, are not only widespread, but also can shape the evaluation and 
interpretation of information presented during a trial.8  Implicit racial biases 
are perhaps even more unsettling than factors such as attractiveness—while 
assessments of the latter can vary from one person to the next, and 
potentially balance out across judges and jurors, the majority of people have 
implicit racial biases that trend in a specific direction.9  The problem of 
extralegal factors in the courtroom therefore extends much deeper and wider 
                                                 
3  Danziger et al., supra note 1, at 6890. 
4  Meredith Melnick, When Lunch Is Served, So Is Justice, TIME (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://healthland.time.com/2011/04/14/when-lunch-is-served-so-is-justice 
[https://perma.cc/HQE4-2VUA]. 
5  Zoë Corbyn, Hungry Judges Dispense Rough Justice, NATURE NEWS (Apr. 
11, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110411/full/news.2011.227.html 
[https://perma.cc/F6TU-3K3Q]. 
6  EDIE GREENE & KIRK HEILBRUN, WRIGHTSMAN’S PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 298–303 (Wadsworth, 7th ed. 2011).  
7  Ray Bull, Physical Appearance and Criminality, 2 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 
REVIEWS 269, 274–75 (1982); Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Reacting to 
Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility, 49 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 202, 202-04, 210–13 (2009); see ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE 
NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE 3–25 (2015). 
8  Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 
1126–68 (2012); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221–26 (2009). 
9  Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)ethical Are You? HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 
2003, at 56, 58–60; Chris Mooney, Across America, Whites Are Biased and They 
Don’t Even Know It, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/08/across-america-whites-
are-biased-and-they-dont-even-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/BP6W-MGNK].   
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than hungry or tired judges.  
Given the amount of existing literature on extralegal factors and implicit 
racial biases, what should warrant consternation is not the mere presence of 
such factors in the courtroom, but the relative lack of steps taken to mitigate 
them.  While some countermeasures have been suggested,10 none appear to 
be sufficiently promising solutions.  This Article aims to propose and 
examine an unconventional method to reduce implicit racial biases in the 
courtroom, specifically the use of virtual reality.  Although the actual 
materialization of such a prospect is still distant, researchers are beginning to 
discover various techniques that have the potential to ameliorate the impact 
of these biases.  
Should such research come to fruition, this Article suggests that virtual 
reality training to reduce implicit racial biases in judges and jurors would be 
a justifiable and desirable endeavor.  Part I provides a summary of the 
literature on implicit racial bias, with special attention to studies in the 
courtroom setting.  Part II offers an overview and critique of commonly 
suggested countermeasures, while Part III proposes virtual reality as an 
alternative strategy.  Part IV argues the case for virtual reality training with 
judges, addressing potential objections that might ensue.  Lastly, Part V 
applies this framework to the jury context, articulating the main divergences 
from the case of judges.  
Since virtual reality paradigms have not been explicitly designed for use 
in the courtroom setting, this Article should be read primarily as a thought 
experiment.  The main purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the 
advantage of incorporating virtual reality into the courtroom, not to delineate 
plans for its actual implementation.  Through advocating for further research 
on virtual reality paradigms, and proposing potential policies for introducing 
the technology to the courts, this Article seeks, at the very least, to guide 
future discussion on novel and unconventional methods to reduce implicit 
racial bias in the courtroom.   
  
                                                 
10  Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1169–86; Dale K. Larson, A Fair and Implicitly 
Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association Test during 
Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139, 158–69 (2010); Rachlinski et al., supra 
note 8, at 1226–31; Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection 
of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 857–75 (2012); Samuel R. Sommers & 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice against Black 
Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 221–23 
(2001). 
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 I.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM: A PRIMER ON IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN THE 
COURTROOM 
 
A. Fairness, Impartiality, and the Nature of Bias 
 
The notion of a “fair and impartial trial” is one of the most championed 
aspects of the justice system.11  Yet, despite this concept’s widespread 
acclaim, and its appearance throughout multiple legal standards,12 an official 
explanation of the phrase is absent from legal doctrine.  Although fairness is 
often associated with due process, equal treatment under the law, and the 
assurance that each defendant receives the protections he is guaranteed,13 it is 
unclear how and to what extent fairness relates to impartiality.  Namely, how 
impartial must a trial be in order to meet expectations of fairness, and at what 
point does the presence of partiality violate such standards?  While this 
Article does not purport to definitively answer this question, it is necessary to 
define a baseline understanding of impartiality in order to frame the 
discussion of bias in the courtroom.  
One way to analyze standards of impartiality is to reference existing 
doctrine to see what is, and is not, considered an acceptable level of bias.  In 
the case of judges, simply conjecturing possible sources of bias is generally 
insufficient grounds for disqualification; instead, there needs to be a 
reasonable expectation that certain factors would interfere with a judge’s 
ability to “be impartial,” whether the bias constitutes an actual conflict of 
interest, or creates a legitimate appearance of partiality.14  For jurors, 
standards of impartiality are somewhat lower.15  During voir dire, individuals 
                                                 
11  ANDREW G. FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 4–6 (NYU Press, 2013) (discussing the importance of the 
Sixth Amendment and the role of jury trials). 
12  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2014); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2014). 
13  See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO.112-
9, 112th Cong., 2d Sess.1611-16 (2014), www.gpo.gov/constitutionannotated 
[https://perma.cc/RW4C-62B4] (discussing fairness, due process, and constitutional 
protections as they apply to juries and the Sixth Amendment).  
14  See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (indicating when parties suspect judicial bias, they can 
file an affidavit that “shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or 
prejudice exists . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of 
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned . . . He shall also disqualify himself . . . [w]here he 
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding”); CHARLES G. GEYH, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 17–22 (2d ed. 2010) (analyzing the 
details and interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455).  
15  See Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array: A Structural 
Theory of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1183–86 
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expressing potential bias may still be selected for jury service if they assert 
that their biases can be put aside to “impartially” hear the case.16  At the 
same time, however, pretrial publicity can lead to a change in trial venue, on 
the basis that exposing jurors to prejudicial information before the trial might 
impede their ability to (a) hear the case with an open mind and (b) adhere to 
the presumption of innocence; explicit conflicts of interest can disqualify 
jurors for the same reasons.17  Taken together, these facts suggest that 
impartiality does not necessarily entail complete neutrality or a lack of 
preexisting opinions on issues relevant to the trial; nevertheless, the law does 
seem to draw a line when preconceptions would foreseeably influence the 
decision-making process.  This Article therefore defines impartiality as the 
absence of preconceived notions that would reasonably impact a judge or 
juror’s assessment of information presented throughout the case in a manner 
that favored or disfavored a defendant. 
The remainder of Part I argues that implicit racial biases render judges 
and jurors incapable of meeting this basic conceptualization of impartiality.  
Not only can these biases alter the way in which individuals interpret 
information, but they also tend to disproportionately disadvantage members 
of one race.  The following section explains how general biases persist in the 
courtroom in the first place, and why implicit racial biases in particular pose 
such a threat to the fairness and impartiality of trials.  
The justice system possesses mechanisms to screen for clear instances of 
bias in judges and jurors.  In the case of judges, parties may request that the 
judge recuse herself if there is reason to suspect partiality.18  With jurors, the 
voir dire process enables attorneys and judges to ask probing questions of 
potential jurors to uncover signs of bias.19  Despite these protocols, partiality 
still plays a large role in the courtroom for three main reasons: (1) the bias 
blindspot, (2) the social desirability effect, and (3) the existence of implicit 
biases. According to the concept of bias blindspots, while people are aware 
that biases occur in the general population, they tend to overestimate their 
own degree of impartiality.20  Next, the social desirability effect highlights 
individuals’ perceived need for others to view them in a socially respectable 
light, which often prevents people from disclosing biases that are regarded as 
taboo.21  Lastly, motions for recusal and the voir dire process primarily target 
explicit biases, which are attitudes or prejudices that individuals consciously 
                                                                                                                   
(1995) (explaining how the standard of impartiality for jurors is ambiguous, and that 
in many cases jurors can still serve despite expressing some degree of bias).  
16  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 13, at 1619–20; NEIL VIDMAR & 
VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 90–93 (2007). 
17  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 13, at 1620–21. 
18  28 U.S.C. § 144. 
19  FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. 
20  Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1173–74. 
21  VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 16, at 92–93. 
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possess.22  As a result, the justice system leaves untouched many implicit 
biases that judges and jurors are not aware of having, but that are believed to 
account for a disturbingly high percentage of behavior.23  
Implicit biases, which often diverge from one’s explicitly held beliefs,24 
are an inevitable byproduct of having efficient cognitive systems.25  In order 
to quickly make sense of all the stimuli bombarding them, people make 
generalizations about various individuals, social groups, and situations in a 
way that enables prediction of subsequent interactions and outcomes.26  
While the ability to make generalizations is frequently harmless and even 
quite useful in terms of efficiency, such judgments can also lead to negative 
assessments of individuals, as well as stereotypical associations between 
specific attributes and identity groups.27  The automatic and influential nature 
of these biases can be appreciated by neuroscientific research involving 
implicitly prejudiced or stereotyped evaluations.  For example, studies have 
explored activation in brain regions such as the amygdala, the anterior insula, 
and the anterior temporal lobe, which are implicated in threat processing, 
disgust reactions, and social stereotyping, respectively.28  Researchers have 
observed increased activation in these three areas when white participants 
view black faces, and this heightened reactivity positively correlates with the 
degree of implicit racial bias.29  Accordingly, the fact that initial reactions of 
threat and disgust can arise when simply viewing a member of a racial 
outgroup presents serious problems in the trial context, where judges and 
jurors are expected to enter the courtroom with an open mind. 
 
B. Measuring Implicit Racial Bias 
 
Before delving into studies examining implicit racial bias in the 
courtroom, it is helpful to first explain how researchers identify the presence 
and magnitude of these biases, as well as describe the patterns that typically 
emerge.  The most commonly used method is the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT), which measures reaction times during a sorting task.30  The race 
                                                 
22  Larson, supra note 10, at 141; Casey Reynolds, Implicit Bias and the Problem 
of Certainty in the Criminal Standard of Proof, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 230–
31 (2013); Roberts, supra note 10, at 835–42. 
23   Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1201–02. 
24   Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 56–58. 
25  JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 213–15 
(2012). 
26  David M. Amodio, The Neuroscience of Prejudice and Stereotyping, 15 
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 670, 670 (2014). 
27  WARD, supra note 25, at 213. 
28  Amodio, supra note 26, at 671, 673, 676. 
29  Id. at 671–73, 676. 
30  See Brian A. Nosek et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association 
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version of the IAT shows participants two sets of paired terms, with one set 
on the upper left corner of a computer screen and the other on the upper right 
corner.31  A participant will either see a “stereotype-congruent” arrangement 
of Black/Bad in one corner and White/Good in the other, or a “stereotype-
incongruent” arrangement with pairings of Black/Good and White/Bad.32  
When presented with black and white faces, as well as positive and negative 
words, participants must match the particular stimulus with its appropriate 
label in one of the corners of the screen.33  After a participant completes trials 
with both stereotype-congruent and incongruent pairings, the average 
reaction times for the two trials are compared.34  A faster response for 
stereotype-congruent pairings suggests a preference for white faces, which 
can be further categorized according to a slight, moderate, or strong degree.35  
The IAT can be used for many stereotype-based associations other than race 
(such as gender, age, etc.), and has been taken by over 4.5 million people.36  
Interestingly, not only do 75% of all participants show a preference towards 
white faces,37 but non-white participants tend to also exhibit a preference for 
white faces (while simultaneously displaying a greater preference than 
average for members of their own race).38  Additionally, researchers have 
modified the Race IAT to test the association between race and guilt.39  This 
version of the test has been coined the Guilt IAT, and has shown that 
individuals commonly associate black men with terminology related to 
criminal culpability.40  These results might be especially concerning in light 
of confirmation biases, which hold that people are more likely to interpret 
evidence in a way that aligns with their presuppositions.41    
 Apart from the IAT, two other tests are frequently used to measure 
                                                                                                                   
Test: II. Method Variables and Construct Validity, 31 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 166, 
179 (2005) (addressing common criticisms of the IAT and providing evidence for 
construct validity); About the IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html [https://perma.cc/M7Z7-5V2V] 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016) (explaining the basic attributes of the IAT). 
31  About the IAT, supra note 30. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id.  
35  Frequently Asked Questions, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/3RU3-RCPA] (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2016).  
36  Brandon Keim, Researchers Try to Cure Racism, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2009, 5:25 
PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/01/racetraining/ [https://perma.cc/W6AQ-CMSP]. 
37  Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 3. 
38  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 35. 
39  Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty 
Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189–90 (2010). 
40  Id. 
41  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 80–81 (2011).  
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implicit racial bias in criminal contexts: the Weapons Identification Task and 
the Shoot No-Shoot Test.  The Weapons Identification Task, also a measure 
of response time, displays a picture of either a gun or a tool on the computer 
screen and asks participants to identify the object presented.42  Prior to seeing 
the object, a white or black face is quickly flashed on the screen.43  Studies 
using this measure have revealed three particularly important findings.  First, 
when white participants have to make these judgments in a constricted time 
frame, they are more likely to incorrectly identify a tool as a weapon when 
primed with a black face.44  Second, when given unlimited time to complete 
the task, participants are more accurate in their judgments, but correctly 
identify a weapon faster after seeing a black face.45  Lastly, this pattern of 
results persists even when participants are explicitly told to disregard the 
faces and to not let them skew subsequent judgments.46  
A similar paradigm, the Shoot No-Shoot Test, involves a videogame in 
which white and black men appear on the screen, and either have a weapon 
or a neutral object in hand.47  Designed to mimic a situation often 
experienced by police officers, participants are told to shoot those holding a 
weapon while their response times and accuracy levels are measured.48  A 
study involving black and white participants found that both groups were 
faster to shoot armed men when the target was black49 (and were also faster 
in deciding not to shoot an unarmed man when the target was white).50  
Importantly, this study also measured participants’ knowledge and subjective 
evaluations of cultural stereotypes associating black men with violent 
crime.51  While the degree to which participants agreed with this stereotype 
was unrelated to their performance on the task, knowledge of the stereotype 
was positively correlated with incorrect shooting responses.52  Thus, simply 
                                                 
42  B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and 
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 
184 (2001). 
43  Id.  
44  Id. at 189. 
45  Id. at 185–87, 190; B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and 
Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006). 
46  B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias 
and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 388–95 (2002). 
47  Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 
1317–26 (2002). 
48  Id. at 1315–17. 
49  Id. at 1324. 
50  Id.  
51  Id. at 1321. 
52  Id. at 1322–23. 
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being aware of the stereotype influenced decisions, regardless of one’s 
explicit attitudes. 
 
C. Implicit Racial Bias in the Courtroom 
 
Although the IAT, the Weapon Identification Task, and the Shoot-No 
Shoot Test are often used to examine implicit racial bias in the general 
population, a few studies have applied these measures specifically to the 
courtroom setting.53  Given the difficulties of conducting real-time 
experiments during trials, most studies addressing judges and jurors involve 
evaluations of hypothetical scenarios or post-hoc analyses of trial outcomes.  
Nevertheless, these studies reveal that implicit racial biases in judges and 
jurors are likely to have potent impacts on criminal justice proceedings.54   
To start, research has illuminated the effect of a defendant’s race on 
judicial behavior in both hypothetical situations and actual sentencing 
patterns.55  In a study exploring implicit racial bias in judges, Jeffrey 
Rachlinski and colleagues56 administered the Race IAT to judges of varying 
races, genders, and jurisdictions.  Overall, the white judges demonstrated a 
strong preference for white faces while the black judges did not display an 
overarching trend one way or the other.57  The researchers then provided 
these judges with a hypothetical scenario in which either the defendant was 
black and the victim was white, or vice versa.58  Interestingly, the authors 
observed significant correlations between IAT scores and conviction 
decisions only among the black judges.59  When the defendant was white, 
black judges with an IAT preference for black faces were more likely to 
convict than were those with a white preference.60  This pattern flipped when 
the defendant was black, meaning that black judges with a preference for 
                                                 
53  See Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in 
Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 676–78 (2004); Levinson et al., supra 
note 39, at 201–08; Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: 
Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. 
L. REV. 307, 331–39 (2010); Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1204–11; Sommers & 
Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 216–21. 
54  Blair et al., supra note 53, at 678; Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1142–52; 
Larson, supra note 10, at 154–58; Levinson et al., supra note 39, at 207; Levinson & 
Young, supra note 53, at 344–45; Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1225–26; 
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 220–21. 
55  See Blair et al., supra note 53, at 675–78; Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 
1204–11. 
56  Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1204–11. 
57  Id. at 1210. 
58  Id. at 1211–12. 
59  Id. at 1218–21. 
60  Id. at 1220–21. 
2016  UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS 127 
 
 
black faces were now less likely to convict.61  The researchers suggest that 
the lack of correlation between IAT scores and conviction decisions in white 
judges might stem from the fact that the majority of the judges were 
cognizant of the experiment’s purpose.62 Social desirability effects might 
therefore explain the behavior of the white judges, who might have 
anticipated that the researchers were expecting them to respond in a certain 
way.63  Nonetheless, this study reveals that implicit racial biases are not only 
prevalent among judges, but that they also can occur in judges of differing 
races.  
With respect to the impact of race on actual sentencing decisions, studies 
have found that on average, black defendants are given longer sentences than 
white defendants, and are also more likely to receive the death penalty.64  In 
fact, a study exploring the correlation between race and sentence length in a 
Florida prison population found that within white and black subgroups, the 
more an inmate possessed Afrocentric physiognomic features, the longer his 
sentence.65  These results have been explained by referencing the 
neuroscientific literature cited earlier;66 since the amygdala responds to 
threat, and black individuals are often associated with violent crime, this 
stereotype of “black-crime” might induce amygdala-driven threat responses 
that subconsciously guide judicial sentencing decisions.67 
Turning to jurors, a study using a mock jury examined the relationship 
between implicit racial bias and the interpretation of evidence.68  The 
researchers manipulated one piece of evidence between the experimental and 
control group, namely whether the hand of a masked gunman in a picture 
was light or dark skinned.69  At the end of the experiment, the majority of 
mock jurors were unable to report the skin tone of the person depicted in the 
image, yet on average, those who saw the dark skinned version deemed the 
defendant to be guiltier than those presented with the light skinned version.70  
In a similar study, researchers incorporated both the Race IAT as well as the 
Guilt IAT.71  When presented with ambiguous evidence and asked to 
evaluate the degree to which it informed judgments of guilt or innocence, 
those with higher scores on both types of the IAT were more likely to rate 
                                                 
61  Id.  
62  Id. at 1223–24. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 1196; Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1148.  
65  Blair et al., supra note 53, at 676–78.  
66  Amodio, supra note 26, at 671, 673, 676. 
67  Kimberly Papillon, The Court’s Brain: Neuroscience and Judicial Decision 
Making in Criminal Sentencing, 49 CT. REV. 48, 51, 54 (2013). 
68  Levinson & Young, supra note 53, at 331–39. 
69  Id. at 332. 
70  Id. at 337–38. 
71  Levinson et al., supra note 39, at 201–08. 
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such evidence as supporting a guilty verdict.72  In other words, participants 
who possessed preferences for white faces and more frequently associated 
blacks with criminal guilt tended to view vague evidence as a testament to 
the defendant’s culpability.  Hence, even if implicit racial biases do not 
influence the ultimate decisions of mock jurors, at the very least they can 
impact how jurors weigh and interpret information provided during a trial.73  
Additionally, in some mock jury studies, researchers have observed “race 
salience” effects, whereby white jurors are more likely to convict black 
defendants in hypothetical scenarios when the subject of race is not explicitly 
called to their attention; however, these jurors are much less likely to convict 
when race plays a prominent role in the details of the case.74  Similar to 
Rachlinski and colleagues,75 researchers have explained these findings 
through the lens of social desirability effects, in which white participants 
might be making a purposeful effort to avoid displaying any signs of racism 
in situations where others might be expecting them to do so.76   
In sum, although there is limited research regarding the impact of 
implicit racial biases on actual case outcomes, the studies we do have suggest 
that judges and jurors are susceptible to these biases in a way that can 
influence evaluations throughout the trial process. 
 
D. Exacerbating Factors 
 
In addition to documenting the prevalence of implicit racial bias, 
researchers have also discovered certain factors that can exacerbate these 
biases.  First, as noted earlier, stereotypes enable us to process information 
quickly and make automatic judgments.77  These fast-paced decisions, which 
can lead to the use of negative stereotypes,78 occur more frequently in 
situations involving vague information or general uncertainty—two factors 
endemic to the trial environment.79  Second, as seen with social desirability 
and race salience effects, individuals do have the capacity to monitor the 
influence of implicit or explicit biases under certain circumstances.80  
However, this ability requires vigilant self-regulation,81 and tasks that 
involve a high degree of cognitive effort will subsume a significant portion 
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74  Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 216–21. 
75  Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1223–24. 
76  Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 222–23. 
77  WARD, supra note 25, at 213. 
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79  Larson, supra note 10, at 148–49. 
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of one’s mental control capacities.82  Thus, in situations (much like the 
courtroom setting) where individuals must pay close attention to specific 
facts and details, the ability to monitor biases will be substantially 
decreased.83  Third, emotions can often compromise decision-making 
capacities and heighten the influence of implicit biases.84  In fact, simply 
eliciting feelings of disgust prior to taking an IAT can make preferences 
against an outgroup more severe.85  This finding could pose serious concerns 
in the courtroom setting if initial visceral reactions in response to the 
defendant’s race or the nature of the crime exacerbate the influence of 
implicit biases.  The amplifying impact of emotions on implicit biases could 
also occur if judges or jurors become stressed during trial; when making 
evaluations regarding the morality of a situation, stress has been shown to 
decrease an individual’s ability to comprehensively take relevant details into 
account as well as increase one’s reliance on automatic judgments.86  
Therefore, not only are implicit racial biases a prominent factor during trials, 
but the courtroom setting itself can also magnify their influence.  
 
 II.  PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATION 
 
A. Frequently Proposed Solutions 
 
Given the prevalence of implicit racial biases in the courtroom, multiple 
legal scholars and psychologists have suggested strategies for mitigation.  
These proposed interventions include (1) raising awareness, (2) screening 
with the IAT prior to trial, (3) weakening stereotypical associations, and (4) 
increasing diversity among judges and jurors.  
Arguments in favor of raising awareness draw support from literature on 
self-regulation and active monitoring.87  In particular, proponents frequently 
cite the social desirability and race salience effects discussed above to show 
that focusing attention on race can help motivate heightened scrutiny of one’s 
own decisions.88  Similarly, scholars point to research suggesting a 
                                                 
82   KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 41. 
83  See id. (explaining how self-control becomes significantly more difficult when 
cognitive resources are already being expended on other tasks); Papillon, supra note 
67, at 52. 
84  Christoph Bublitz, Moral Enhancement and Mental Freedom, 33 J. APPLIED 
PHIL. 88, 96 (2015). 
85  Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence of 
Specific Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585, 586–88 (2009). 
86  Lucius Caviola & Nadira S. Faber, How Stress Influences Our Morality, THE 
INQUISITIVE MIND MAG. (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.in-mind.org/article/how-stress-
influences-our-morality [https://perma.cc/LK3Y-F6KL].  
87  Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1202–04; Roberts, supra note 10, at 873–74. 
88  Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1202–04; Roberts, supra note 10, at 873–74. 
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connection between motivation and behavior,89 claiming that if courts make 
judges and jurors more aware of implicit racial bias, they will be more 
inclined to regulate their own behavior, which will in turn help to reduce the 
influence of such biases.90  In fact, Anna Roberts proposes educating jurors 
about implicit racial bias through juror orientation videos, as these materials 
are designed to encourage jurors’ sense of civic duty and galvanize them to 
contribute their best efforts in the pursuit of justice.91 
Turning to the second proposal, some scholars suggest implementing 
screening protocols into the jury selection process in order to eliminate those 
with strong implicit racial biases.  For example, Dale Larson proposes 
administering the IAT to potential jurors during voir dire.92  He contends that 
not only would such testing increase the motivation in all jurors to reduce 
their biases, but it would also flag individuals who possessed severe biases.93  
This might subsequently facilitate the decision process for attorneys making 
challenges for cause, effectively removing these individuals from the jury 
pool for that trial.94  Such a screening strategy would similarly apply to 
judges, whereby IAT testing would take place before the assignment of a 
judge to a case. 
Third, multiple scholars advocate interventions that target the stereotypes 
themselves.95  By weakening the association between black men and violent 
crime, for example, the stereotype might become less hardwired and 
automatic.96  Proposed mitigation methods involve presenting people with 
counter-stereotypical examples, whether through placing portraits of famous 
black historical figures on the wall,97 or by having a black individual proctor 
an IAT.98  Many proponents99 also cite a 2001 study by Nilanjana Dasgupta 
and Anthony Greenwald, in which the presentation of both revered black 
                                                 
89  Amodio, supra note 26, at 671; WARD, supra note 25, at 219–20. 
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92  Larson, supra note 10, at 162–71. 
93  Id. at 167. 
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Prejudice in Context: Variability in Automatically Activated Attitudes, 81 J. 
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97  Id. at 1171. 
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99  Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1171; Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term 
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leaders and disliked white historical figures reduced implicit racial bias 
scores.100  In addition to displaying counter-stereotypical images, researchers 
have also explored the use of mental imagery exercises to weaken negative 
stereotypes.101  In fact, mental imagery exercises, in which individuals 
visualize certain scenarios, have been shown to be very effective in helping 
people carry out goal-directed actions.102  Researchers attribute these results 
to the dynamic nature of imagination and the involvement of the same 
sensory activation patterns as those needed in real-life situations.103  In the 
context of implicit biases, studies asking individuals to visualize positive 
counter-stereotypes have found considerable success in reducing IAT 
scores.104 
The fourth and final commonly proposed intervention105 involves 
diversifying the pool of judges and jurors.106  Since the mere presence of 
someone with an additional perspective can have positive effects on group 
decision-making,107 scholars contend that the presence of judges with 
different viewpoints or identity-related characteristics might broaden the 
perspectives of their fellow colleagues.108  With juries, not only do more 
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107  Sandra W. DeGrassi et al., Ethical Decision-Making: Group Diversity Holds 
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108  See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1231 (mentioning impact of judges with 
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diverse mock juries display heightened scrutiny and engage in more carefully 
reasoned discussions,109 but the anticipation of serving on a diverse mock 
jury can also reduce implicit racial biases.110  In a study comparing a 
homogenous white mock jury to a diverse mock jury, those on the diverse 
jury were significantly less likely to consider a black defendant guilty prior 
to the group discussion.111  The author, Samuel Sommers, hypothesizes that 
the element of race was made more salient for the white jurors on the diverse 
mock jury, who as a result made more concerted efforts to avoid exhibiting 
bias;112 Sommers additionally claims that this diverse panel composition 
impacted the way in which jurors interpreted the evidence presented to 
them.113  Furthermore, scholars suggest that enhancing the diversity of jurors 
would differentially increase the type or direction of implicit biases within 
the jury, which might serve to nullify at least some of these biases.114   
 
B. Criticisms of Proposed Solutions 
 
Although these suggestions have their merits, all four methods have 
serious shortcomings in the courtroom setting.  With respect to raising 
awareness, increasing motivation to facilitate a fair trial and promoting 
knowledge about implicit biases are both laudable goals for obvious reasons.  
However, in the context of race, three main concerns arise: (1) these 
interventions might not have an appreciable effect on many individuals, (2) 
the methods might actually have a counterproductive effect on some people, 
and (3) many of the factors known to exacerbate implicit racial biases are 
also those required for these interventions to succeed.  
As previously mentioned, proponents of raising awareness frequently 
cite studies in which individuals demonstrate less biased behavior due to race 
salience and social desirability effects.115  Yet, while these studies do exist, 
there is also a body of literature suggesting that simply being aware of bias 
does not significantly ameliorate its influence.116  For example, recall the 
study on the weapon bias effect, where individuals were primed with black or 
white faces prior to seeing a tool or a gun, and were explicitly told to avoid 
letting the face impact their decisions.117  Despite this warning, participants 
                                                 
109  VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 16, at 75. 
110  Sommers, supra note 106, at 600–06.   
111  Id. at 603. 
112  Id. at 607. 
113  Id.  
114  VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 16, at 75; Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1180–81. 
115  Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 100, at 806–07; Rachlinski et al., supra 
note 8, at 1204; Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 220–23. 
116  Amodio, supra note 26, at 679; Devine et al., supra note 99, at 13; Payne et al, 
supra note 46, at 389–95. 
117  Payne et al, supra note 46, at 388–89. 
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still tended to identify the object as a weapon when primed with a black 
face;118 in other words, calling attention to the risk of implicit racial bias had 
a negligible effect on reducing its impact.  Moreover, in a longitudinal study 
involving various self-regulation strategies, researchers found that 
participants in the control group, who simply took the IAT and were told 
their results, did not show reduced bias on subsequent IATs.119  While the 
control group in this experiment was not explicitly educated about the 
influence and nature of implicit racial biases after taking the IAT,120 these 
findings nevertheless question the assertion that basic awareness can result in 
a significant reduction of bias.  
Solely raising awareness not only might be futile in many judges and 
jurors, but when awareness interventions take the form of emphasizing race 
salience or facilitating social desirability effects, the outcome might actually 
contribute to the impact of bias rather than mitigate it.  This conclusion stems 
from a consideration of why implicit racial biases are concerning in the first 
place.  To start, they might disproportionately increase the probability of a 
guilty verdict or a longer sentence for defendants of certain races. Second, 
they might play a role in judicial or juror decision-making despite being a 
patently extralegal factor.  Accentuating race salience and social desirability 
effects (by leading white judges and jurors to consciously monitor their own 
behavior on the basis of potential racial bias) would likely ameliorate the first 
concern.  However, the act of making race a central consideration would 
simultaneously intensify the second concern.  Namely, by taking concerted 
efforts to not stereotype a black defendant, the race of the defendant 
inevitably becomes an explicit factor in a judge or juror’s thought process.  
Furthermore, by amplifying social desirability effects, some individuals 
might overcorrect for bias and redress neither the first nor the second 
concern.  A case that proponents of raising awareness often use to bolster 
their argument actually provides an excellent example of this potential 
counter-effect.121  The study gave doctors a hypothetical scenario in which a 
patient exhibited specific symptoms, and subsequently asked the doctors to 
rate the degree to which they would recommend a certain treatment.122  For 
some, this hypothetical involved a black patient, while for others the patient 
was white.123  Doctors with stronger white preferences on the IAT who (a) 
saw the version with the black patient and (b) were cognizant of the purpose 
of the experiment were much more likely to support administering the 
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treatment than their cohorts given the white patient.124  Importantly, these 
compensatory effects did not raise the level of recommendation to be equal 
to that given for white patients, but instead surpassed it.125  Thus, social 
desirability or race salience effects might funnel the influence of bias in the 
opposite direction.   
Even if raising awareness did promote less biased behavior, the impact of 
such an intervention would rely heavily on active self-regulation and 
effortful mental strategies. Yet, as previously mentioned, trials are inherently 
stressful and cognitively demanding,126 so the remaining resources available 
to vigilantly monitor one’s bias would be quite limited.127  Without persistent 
self-regulation, significant reductions in implicit racial biases would be 
unlikely.128  Additionally, successfully monitoring one’s biases might come 
at the price of not fully focusing on the facts of the case.  
The second proposition, screening with the IAT, is also an unsatisfactory 
solution.  Although this method would likely reduce the net level of implicit 
racial bias, there are multiple objections to be made.  First, scholars caution 
against using the IAT as a diagnostic tool since it was designed to produce 
reliable results on an average group level, not to make predictions for 
specific individuals.129  Regardless, incorporating screening methods might 
limit the pool from which potential judges or jurors can be drawn.  To see 
how this might be the case, consider that if such a policy were to be 
implemented, it would make sense to screen for those with moderate or 
strong preferences in order to substantially reduce the level of implicit racial 
bias in the courtroom, at least to a degree that would objectively make 
designing, introducing, and enforcing the policy worthwhile.  However, data 
from an experiment surveying IAT scores across the United States suggests 
that the majority of people have more than just a slight bias, and that the 
average level of bias varies from state to state.130  With judges, not only 
would screening narrow the pool of those eligible to hear a case, but this also 
might cause logistical issues since judges are already limited in number and 
have burdensome caseload pressures, particularly at the trial court level.131  
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In the case of jurors, if citizens have a strong interest or a right to serve on a 
jury (a question that will be addressed in Part V), then a large number of 
people would be barred from accessing this opportunity, especially in a state 
with more severe biases on average.  As the number of eligible jurors 
decreases, the ability of the jury pool to be representative of the community 
might also decline.  Such a result would be problematic, as the jury pool is 
supposed to involve “a fair cross-section of the community.”132  Although a 
pre-screened jury pool would be more impartial with respect to implicit racial 
biases, it might not be sufficiently representative or unbiased in other 
domains given its limited size.  Additionally, requiring judges and jurors to 
take the IAT might raise concerns with privacy.133  Even though judges and 
jurors are already asked to divulge personal information during motions for 
recusal or voir dire,134 the fact that individuals are often not cognizant of 
their implicit biases might render IAT scores a further breach of privacy than 
is currently accepted. In other words, determining an individual’s level of 
implicit racial bias goes past what the individual could reveal on her own, 
and exposes subconscious thoughts that are socially undesirable.  
The third proposition, weakening stereotypes, has its own set of 
problems as well.  As noted earlier, proponents of this method often invoke 
Dasgupta and Greenwald’s study135 involving portraits of famous historical 
figures.136  However, when a different group of researchers tried to replicate 
these results, they found that the stereotypes were harder to break than 
previously suggested.137  In order to determine whether examples of both 
positive black figures and negative white figures were necessary to achieve 
the effect, the researchers ran an experiment using solely counter-
stereotypical exemplars of black individuals.138  Not only did the authors not 
observe any significant reduction in implicit racial bias following the 
intervention,139 but also when they added disliked white figures back into the 
experiment, the reduction occurred with a substantially smaller effect size 
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than Dasgupta and Greenwald had reported.140  Thus, using counter-
stereotypical pictures to successfully reduce implicit racial biases against 
black individuals required encouraging negative stereotypes of white 
individuals (at least with this specific protocol).  Implementing a strategy that 
degrades one group in order to counteract the degradation of another group 
seems both counterintuitive and unwarranted, especially if the effects of this 
strategy are not as potent as presumed.  Granted, other methods exist besides 
Dasgupta and Greenwald’s paradigm.  For instance, researchers have also 
addressed stereotypes by improving white participants’ ability to differentiate 
between various black individuals’ faces.141  By reducing the tendency to 
pigeonhole outgroup members into a unified stereotyped category, facial 
recognition training can decrease implicit racial bias scores.142  Yet, not only 
does this method provoke race salience issues, but it can also take up to 10 
hours143 to complete, which is an impractical and infeasible timeframe for the 
courtroom setting.  
Although mental imagery exercises entail a faster process, they are also 
unlikely to be productive in the courtroom.  For one, these exercises rely 
extensively on the cooperative effort of individuals, and there might also be a 
large degree of variation in the content and vividness of these simulations 
from one person to the next (given idiosyncrasies inherent to imagination).  
To achieve a more standardized process, one might suggest simply showing 
judges or jurors a video.  An experiment employing this approach found 
reduced IAT scores after participants watched video clips of black 
individuals in positive contexts, such as a family barbeque.144  However, only 
showing one race, even if it avoids presenting negative images of another 
race, positions racial factors as an obviously salient issue.  Additionally, 
despite capturing the dynamic aspect of mental imagery in a systematized 
manner, the interactive effects of imaginative exercises, which are considered 
one of the most important features for enhancing learning,145 are lacking in 
video-based strategies. 
Lastly, while the fourth proposition, diversification, seems the most 
promising in principle, this type of intervention by itself would likely still be 
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insufficient to adequately reduce implicit racial biases across trials.  To start, 
diversification efforts would mainly be isolated to jurors, since a single judge 
hears most cases.  Unless we overhaul the current system to make all trial 
courts involve a panel of judges,146 making the pool of judges more diverse 
would have negligible effects, as individual judges would still lack the 
opportunity to have their opinions or decisions checked by a colleague of a 
different perspective during the trial.  Put differently, increasing the diversity 
among judges might be beneficial for broadening viewpoints or attitudes in 
general, but cannot adequately address implicit racial biases when only one 
judge manages a case.  With juries, despite the fact that group dynamics are a 
central feature of their decision-making process, several considerations 
complicate diversification efforts.  Looking for diverse jurors requires a 
definition of diversity, and might lead to quotas or arbitrary decisions about 
who is diverse enough to facilitate the desired effects.  Moreover, while 
heterogeneous groups tend to arrive at more carefully reasoned decisions 
than homogenous groups,147 having too many disparate or competing voices 
can hinder cooperation and thwart the original benefits of diversification.148  
Further, diversification interventions would be vulnerable to the issues 
discussed above regarding overcompensation from race salience and social 
desirability effects.  If white jurors start making concerted efforts to not 
appear racially biased to jurors of other races, they might form their decisions 
in a manner that goes beyond neutrality and instead constitutes bias in the 
other direction. 
 
 III.  VIRTUAL REALITY: A PROOF OF CONCEPT 
 
Implicit racial bias poses serious concerns for the justice system, but 
existing proposals for mitigation fall short.  Yet, what if alternative methods 
could provide a more effective means to reduce implicit racial biases in both 
judges and jurors?  While the science is still emerging, there is reason to 
believe that virtual reality paradigms could meet these criteria in the future, 
diminishing the influence of learned stereotypes without relying on self-
regulation capabilities.   
                                                 
146  Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1231. 
147  Degrassi et al., supra note 107, at 54. 
148  See Astrid C. Homan & Daan van Knippenberg, Faultlines in Diverse Teams, 
in TOWARDS INCLUSIVE ORGANIZATIONS: DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL 
DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT AT WORK 132 (Sabine Otten et al. eds., 2014) (mentioning 
intergroup bias, in which ingroups and outgroups can form within diverse teams); 
Martha L. Maznevski, Understanding Our Differences: Performance in Decision-
Making Groups with Diverse Members, 47 HUM. REL. 531, 536 (1994) (noting that in 
groups that are heterogeneous with respect to gender and culture, group dynamics 
can sometimes impede effective and efficient decision-making processes). 
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Before delving into potential mechanisms, a few disclaimers are in order. 
First, for the purposes of this Article, virtual reality is broadly defined as any 
technology in which the user experiences and interacts with a virtual 
environment, commonly (but not necessarily) through the perspective of an 
avatar.  Second, because research on the intersection between virtual reality 
and the mitigation of implicit racial bias is in its infancy, some of the 
methods discussed below have only been tested in a handful of studies with 
limited populations and constrained contexts.149  Third, while this Article 
suggests applying these mechanisms to the courtroom setting, none of the 
techniques have been explicitly designed, tested, or even envisioned for that 
particular purpose.150  Fourth, some proposals posited below are mere 
speculation of ways that certain technologies could be employed in the 
courtroom context, and have not been empirically tested.  Consequently, the 
subsequent section seeks to provide a proof of concept, and present an idea 
that has the potential to reduce implicit racial biases in the near future, 
without facing the same roadblocks as the proposals put forth in the existing 
literature. 
A. Visual Imagery and Outgroup Embodiment
Two main assets underlie virtual reality’s promise for the courtroom 
setting: standardized, dynamic imagery and outgroup embodiment.  
149  See, e.g., Elizabeth Behm-Morawitz et al., The Effects of Virtual Racial 
Embodiment in a Gaming App on Reducing Prejudice, 83 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 
396, 398–402 (2016), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03637751.2015.1128556 
[https://perma.cc/JT6N-5LDG]; Victoria Groom et al., The Influence of Racial 
Embodiment on Racial Bias in Immersive Virtual Environments, 4 SOC. INFLUENCE 
231, 231–45 (2009); Belinda Gutierrez et al., “Fair Play”: A Videogame Designed 
to Address Implicit Race Bias through Active Perspective Taking, 3 GAMES FOR 
HEALTH J. 371, 372–76 (2015); Lara Maister et al., Changing Bodies Changes 
Minds: Owning Another Body Affects Social Cognition, 19 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
SCI. 6, 7–10 (2015); Tabitha C. Peck et al., Putting Yourself in the Skin of a Black 
Avatar Reduces Implicit Racial Bias, 22 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 779, 780–86 
(2013);  Grace S. Yang et al., Effects of Avatar Race in Violent Video Games on 
Racial Attitudes and Aggression, 5 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. J. 698, 699–
702 (2014). 
150  While virtual reality has not previously been suggested for bias reduction in 
the courtroom, some scholars and researchers have advocated for its use in other 
domains of criminal justice proceedings, such as for digital reconstructions of crime 
scenes and lineups for eyewitness identification.  Jeremy N. Bailenson et al., 
Courtroom Applications of Virtual Environments, Immersive Virtual Environments, 
and Collaborative Virtual Environments, 28 LAW & POL’Y 249, 254–62 (2006); Lars 
C. Ebert et al., The Forensic Holodeck: An Immersive Display for Forensic Crime
Scene Reconstructions, 10 FORENSIC SCI. MED. & PATHOLOGY 623, 624–26 (2014).
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Returning to one of the suggestions from Part II, mental imagery exercises 
actively engage participants in the simulation of counter-stereotypes,151 but 
individual differences in imagination strategies might prevent these exercises 
from producing consistent results.152  Meanwhile, although videos can ensure 
that individuals all visualize the same material, they lack the interactive 
component that is pivotal for learning.153  Virtual reality could 
simultaneously harness the benefits of mental imagery techniques and videos 
while circumventing their shortcomings.  By designing predetermined 
scenarios and allowing individuals to explore virtual worlds via avatars, 
virtual reality maintains the interactive and dynamic nature154 of mental 
imagery exercises while creating a standardized visual environment. 
Additionally, virtual reality enables participants to actively engage with the 
simulated environment, facilitating better, and more efficient, learning155 
without diminishing cognitive resources.156  
In addition to interactive visualization, virtual reality allows individuals 
to temporarily experience the world from a different perspective.  
Specifically, participants can embody a member of a racial outgroup, which 
can reduce the degree to which individuals differentiate outgroup members 
from themselves.157 Given that implicit biases often stem from automatic 
reactions to potential threats,158 decreasing the “otherness” factor of outgroup 
individuals could weaken the implicit stereotypes.159  Moreover, reducing 
151  Blair et al., supra note 101, at 828–29; Turner & Crisp, supra note 101, at 
135–38. 
152  Turner & Crisp, supra note 101, at 139 (noting individuals’ previous 
experiences can influence the nature and ease with which they imagine intergroup 
contact).  
153  Vogel et al., supra note 145, at 233–35. 
154  Maria V. Sanchez-Vives & Mel Slater, From Presence to Consciousness 
through Virtual Reality, 6 NATURE REVS NEUROSCIENCE 332, 332–34 (2005). 
155  Elinda Ai-Lim Lee & Kok Wai Wong, Learning with Desktop Virtual Reality: 
Low Spatial Ability Learners Are More Positively Affected, 79 COMPUTERS & EDUC.
49, 51, 55 (2014); Barney Dalgarno et al., The Contribution of 3D Environments to 
Conceptual Understanding, in WINDS OF CHANGE IN THE SEA OF LEARNING 149, 151
(O.J. McKerrow ed., 2002). 
156  Dalgarno et al., supra note 155, at 152; Lee & Wong, supra note 155, at 49, 
51. 
157  Behm-Morawitz et al., supra note 149, at 398–400. 
158 Amodio, supra note 26, at 671. 
159  See Sylvia Terbeck et al., β-Adrenoceptor Blockade Modulates Fusiform 
Gyrus Activity to Black versus White Faces, 232 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2951, 
2956 (2015) (discussing neural reaction times to ingroup versus outgroup faces, and 
suggesting that speeding up the reaction time for processing outgroup faces might 
serve to reduce implicit racial biases); Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking 
Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1027, 1027–39 (2011).  
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self-other distinctions through outgroup embodiment has been shown to 
increase empathy and positive feelings towards members of the outgroup in 
question.160  Importantly, taking the perspective of just one member of an 
outgroup can produce results that transfer to the outgroup as a whole, 
allowing virtual embodiment exercises to render large-scale effects using 
small-scale paradigms.161     
In the courtroom context, visual imagery and outgroup embodiment 
could be implemented in at least two forms: digital games and immersive 
virtual environments. 
 
1. Digital Games 
 
Digital games (such as computer and video games) offer a relatively low-
tech method to achieve these benefits.162  While games have not yet been 
developed for implicit bias reduction in the justice system,163 future efforts 
could build on the design of Bernd Wittenbrick and colleagues’ video-based 
study164 to more subtly present counter-stereotypical situations.  For instance, 
an avatar could walk through a park, where families of multiple races are 
enjoying barbeques, reading on a bench, playing fetch with a dog, and so 
forth.  The avatar could interact and engage with the other people in the park 
by joining and participating in their activities.  An alternative setup could 
involve a goal-oriented game, in which players must perform predetermined 
                                                 
160  Behm-Morawitz et al., supra note 149, at 399–400. 
161  Nick Yee & Jeremy Bailenson, Walk a Mile in Digital Shoes: The Impact of 
Embodied Perspective-Taking on The Reduction of Negative Stereotyping in 
Immersive Virtual Environments, refereed presentation at the Cleveland State 
University Proceedings of PRESENCE: The 9th Annual International Workshop on 
Presence 147, 148, 154 (Aug. 24-26, 2006), 
http://astro.temple.edu/~lombard/ISPR/Proceedings/2006/P2006proceedings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U8NB-E8CY]. 
162  See Gutierrez et al., supra note 149 at 372. 
163  A few studies have explored the impact of digital games on implicit bias in 
general.  Unfortunately, these designs involve highly race-salient scenarios, and thus 
are not applicable to the current context.  See Gutierrez et al., supra note 149 at 372–
76, for a discussion that found implicit racial biases were lower for participants with 
high empathy, and Grace S. Yang et al., supra note 149, at 699–702, for a discussion 
on heightened implicit racial biases resulting from reinforcement of the “black men-
violent crime” stereotype.  Additionally, one research team recently conducted a 
study in which white participants created an avatar (in a way that minimized race 
salience issues) and explored a basic virtual setting in an online game.  Although the 
study did not examine implicit biases, the authors found an increase in positive 
explicit attitudes towards black individuals among participants who played with 
black avatars compared to those who played with white avatars.  Behm-Morawitz et 
al., supra note 149, at 411. 
164  Wittenbrick et al., supra note 95, at 817–18. 
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actions to earn points.  In either game design, black individuals would subtly 
be presented in positive, counter-stereotypical contexts while participants 
engaged in normal, mundane activities via an outgroup avatar.  Importantly, 
the outgroup identity of the avatar would need to involve multiple 
characteristics to avoid race salience effects.  For example, the outgroup 
identity could entail someone of a different race, age, gender, and 
socioeconomic status,165 which could encourage open attitudes towards 
outgroups in general as opposed to a specified race.  In addition, these games 
could contain mandatory steps that the player must take in order to ensure 
engaged compliance with the digital exercise. 
 
2. Immersive Virtual Environments 
 
Whereas digital games could reduce bias using outgroup avatars in 
counter-stereotypical scenarios, immersive virtual environments could take 
this design one step further.  In immersive virtual environments, participants 
wear a head-mounted display that replaces all visual input from their actual 
surroundings with pre-designed simulations.166  By tracking users’ head and 
body movements, the technology allows participants to interact with the 
setting in a way that strongly mimics real life.167 
Instead of simply personifying an animated character in a digital game, 
immersive virtual environments can induce body ownership illusions, in 
which individuals temporarily feel as though another person’s body part is in 
fact their own.168  Unsurprisingly, these illusions are particularly effective in 
reducing self-other distinctions.169  In an experiment employing this concept, 
Tabitha Peck and colleagues170 had participants enter a virtual environment 
where a mirror reflected back an image of their avatar.  When the participant 
moved his own limbs in front of the mirror, the reflection moved in an 
identically synchronous way.171  Light-skinned participants who were given a 
darker skinned avatar in the virtual setting demonstrated reduced implicit 
racial biases following the experiment.172  A similar technique could be 
                                                 
165  Socioeconomic status could be portrayed via work uniforms.  See Jonathan B. 
Freeman et al., Looking the Part: Social Status Cues Shape Race Perception, 6 PLOS 
ONE e25107, 2 (Sept. 26, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0025107 
[https://perma.cc/L2LH-Q6NV] (using work uniforms, such as business suits and 
janitor outfits, to depict social status in a computer-based perception study).   
166  Sanchez-Vives & Slater, supra note 154, at 332–33. 
167  Id. at 333-34.  
168  Lara Maister et al., supra note 149, 7–10. 
169  Id.  
170  Peck et al., supra note 149, at 780–86.  
171  Id. at 780–82. 
172  Id. at 782–86.  The findings from this study contradict the only other existing 
study on immersive virtual environments and implicit racial biases.  Groom et al., 
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especially potent in the courtroom setting.  Judges and jurors could enter an 
immersive virtual environment via the perspective of an outgroup member, 
and examine their “new” bodies in front of a mirror.  As mentioned in the 
discussion of digital games,173 the identity of the avatar should be 
multifaceted to reduce issues with race salience.  
With respect to practical questions regarding time and cost restraints, 
immersive virtual environments would not pose excessive burdens.  Basic 
setups involve a head-mounted display, headphones for sound perception, 
and motion tracking sensors;174 however some setups, such as Google 
Cardboard, simply require a smartphone and a headset.175  Multiple 
individuals could use the equipment, and head-mounted displays are now 
being sold as consumer products, with prices ranging from approximately 
$20 (e.g., Google Cardboard)176 to $150 (e.g., VisusVR).177  Additionally, 
even though immersive virtual environments require extra time to set up the 
head-mounted display and orient the individual, studies involving this 
technique often last for only a few minutes once the participant enters the 
virtual environment.178 
In sum, virtual reality tasks, whether through digital games or immersive 
virtual environments, could dampen automatic reactions to members of other 
races in a manner that is standardized, interactive, engaging, and feasible.  
Crucially, these methods could achieve such results without confronting the 
                                                                                                                   
supra note 149, 231–45.  Groom and colleagues’ study found increased implicit 
racial bias scores after individuals participated in the virtual reality paradigm.  Id.  
However, as Peck et al. note, Groom and colleagues’ study involved crucial 
differences that might explain the divergence in results.  Id.  For instance, the virtual 
world was more complex, body ownership was not included as an explicit factor, and 
the paradigm involved a job interview, in which race discrimination is a common 
occurrence.  Peck et al., supra note 149, at 785.  
173  See infra Part III.A.1. 
174  See Soo Youn Oh et al., Immersion at Scale: Researcher’s Guide to 
Ecologically Valid Mobile Experiments, presentation at the Clemson University 
School of Computing conference for IIEE Virtual Reality (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://vhil.stanford.edu/mm/2016/01/oh-vr-immersion-at-scale.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GLD3-VTPE] (using and describing a basic setup for mobile 
virtual reality experiments with fewer and cheaper pieces of equipment than in a 
traditional virtual reality laboratory setting).  
175  Get Your Cardboard, CARDBOARD, https://vr.google.com/cardboard/get-
cardboard/ [https://perma.cc/NJ8D-26UG] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
176  Cardboard V2.0, I AM CARDBOARD, http://www.imcardboard.com/cardboard-
v2-0.html [https://perma.cc/TB22-M4Q8] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).  
177  VisusVR Visus, VISUSVR, http://www.visusvr.com/products/visusvr-visus 
[https://perma.cc/6CRF-KDPN] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
178  See, e.g., Peck et al., supra note 149, at 785 (placing participants in virtual 
world for approximately 12 minutes).  
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same pitfalls as the previously suggested measures.179  As opposed to 
strategies aimed at raising awareness, virtual reality exercises do not rely 
heavily on self-regulation throughout the trial.  They do not weaken 
stereotypes by pitting one race against another, nor do they take multiple 
hours to complete.  Unlike diversification proposals, virtual reality applies to 
both jurors and judges, and whereas screening methods automatically 
exclude many members of the population from serving as a judge or juror, 
virtual reality exercises could train anyone who is currently eligible to serve.  
Lastly, virtual reality paradigms can involve nuanced and intricate design 
features, allowing race to be subtly presented without making it an unduly 
salient factor. 
 
B. The Need for Tailored Research Efforts 
 
Although digital games and immersive virtual environments could 
become effective tools in the future, tailored research efforts are necessary to 
move these techniques from theoretical possibilities into viable solutions.  
Specifically, future experiments will need to address (1) the strength, scope, 
and duration of effects, and (2) the degree to which individual differences 
produce variable results.   
To start, researchers should not only explore the extent of bias reduction 
on measures like the IAT, but also on assessments of evidence and 
presumptions of innocence.  Importantly, virtual reality exercises would need 
to achieve these results without creating collateral impacts, such as altering 
other cognitive processes or influencing the decision-making process in 
unforeseen ways.  Otherwise, unintended consequences could nullify the 
exercises’ benefits by producing counterproductive results.  In addition to 
scope and strength, future research must determine the longevity of the 
effects, and determine whether acceptable standards for durability might 
differ between judges and jurors.  For instance, judges are consistently in the 
courtroom setting and would have a continuous need for bias reduction.  In 
contrast, since jurors’ responsibilities terminate at the end of the trial, the 
exercises’ effects should be proportional to the length of their courtroom 
duties.  Compared to digital games, immersive virtual environments would 
likely generate stronger, longer-lasting effects due to their more vicarious 
and life-like nature.180  Until further research measures are taken, it is 
difficult to predict the precise duration of effects; yet, existing research 
                                                 
179  See, e.g., infra Part III.A.1. 
180 Cf. Sun Joo Ahn et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of Embodied 
Experiences in Immersive Virtual Environments on Environmental Locus of Control 
and Behavior, 39 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 235, 239–40 (2014) (comparing the 
strength of effects between video-based methods and immersive virtual 
environments, and discussing the important roles of interaction and realism for 
delivering stronger results in immersive virtual environments). 
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suggests that effects of immersive virtual environments could reasonably 
endure for at least one week.181  Research also indicates that closer tracking 
of head and body movements can lead to more potent results.182  
Consequently, the design of the immersive virtual environment paradigm 
could be more highly advanced in the case of judges to produce longer-
lasting effects.  However, these statements are merely speculative; 
accordingly, future research should identify which technique (between digital 
games or immersive virtual environments) is more efficacious, simple, and 
cost-sensitive to implement.   
Not only are questions of strength, scope, and duration essential to 
resolve, but in order for virtual reality to be useful, it must also reliably 
produce the intended effects in the majority of individuals.  If the techniques 
were only successful in a small portion of the population, the overall 
reduction in implicit racial bias might be too subtle to make the costs of 
implementation worthwhile.  Thus, systematic research would need to 
specifically examine the extent to which individual differences might 
modulate results.   
As a starting point, researchers should replicate the studies mentioned in 
Part I using mock trial scenarios,183 and explore whether and to what degree 
virtual reality training reduces implicit racial biases (compared to a control 
group).  Such a study could be expanded to involve multiple versions of the 
techniques, which could range in levels of complexity, and include 
individuals of different ages, races, and backgrounds.  These studies should 
also entail follow-up tests to provide longitudinal data on the exercises’ 
effects.   
Although virtual reality is not ready for implementation in the 
courtroom, it is important to note that some crucial groundwork has already 
been laid.  To start, digital games and immersive virtual environments are 
becoming increasingly mainstream,184 and continue to be extrapolated to 
novel domains.185  By the time sufficient research has been conducted for its 
                                                 
181 Id. at 237–42.  
182 James J. Cummings & Jeremy N. Bailenson, How Immersive is Enough? A 
Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Immersive Technology on User Presence, 19 MEDIA 
PSYCHOL. 1, 26–27 (2015).  
183  Levinson et al., supra note 39, at 201–08; Levinson & Young, supra note 53, 
at 331–39. 
184  Adi Robertson, The New York Times Is Shipping Google Cardboard to its 
Print Subscribers, THE VERGE (Oct. 20, 2015, 8:47 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2015/10/20/9573165/nyt-vr-new-york-times-cardboard-
app [https://perma.cc/F7S5-DBH4].  
185  Knvul Sheikh, Beyond Gaming: 10 Other Fascinating Uses for Virtual-
Reality Tech, LIVE SCIENCE (Jan. 19, 2016, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.livescience.com/53392-virtual-reality-tech-uses-beyond-gaming.html 
[https://perma.cc/MM35-ACZ5]; Scott Steinberg, The Benefits of Video Games, 
ABC NEWS (Dec. 26, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2011/12/the-
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use in the courtroom setting, virtual reality will likely no longer be regarded 
as a futuristic or novel phenomenon. As a result, people might express less 
initial aversion to virtual reality if they feel more comfortable with the 
technology in the first place.  Second, the presence and influence of implicit 
racial biases are becoming a more discussed issue not only among scholars, 
but also among the general public.186  Within the past year, there has been a 
surge of newspaper articles, blog posts, and other media forums calling 
attention to the problem and expressing a need for change.187  Third, 
technological measures are already being used to enact systemic reform in 
the justice system.188  For instance, discrepancies in the setting of bail across 
similar cases have revealed problems with implicit racial bias, the limitations 
of judicial discretion, and a failure of common practice to meet its intended 
purpose.189  In response, multiple jurisdictions have implemented an 
algorithmic method, which is designed to more objectively assess potential 
risk and facilitate judges in setting bail.190  While initial acceptance of the 
measure was met with resistance, those jurisdictions that have integrated it 
into the decision-making process have become more confident in the fairness 
and legitimacy of the justice system.191  Together, these recent developments 
suggest that virtual reality training is not a purely hypothetical proposal: the 
technology is becoming more widespread, the general public is aware and 
concerned about the issue of implicit racial bias, and steps towards systemic 
change in the courtroom have already been set in motion.   
 
 IV.  VIRTUAL REALITY IN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF JUDGES 
 
To concretize the idea of virtual reality in the courtroom, this Part 
examines how such methods could be applied to judges presiding over 
criminal cases.192   Judges hold a unique position in the legal realm, as they 
                                                                                                                   
benefits-of-video-games/ [https://perma.cc/L2HK-C4D3]. 
186  E.g., Eva Paterson, Unintentional Discrimination Is as Harmful as Real Bias, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015, 6:45 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/27/can-discrimination-exist-
without-clear-intent/unintentional-discrimination-is-as-harmful-as-real-bias 
[https://perma.cc/J9LY-TWTF]; Maanvi Singh, So You Flunked a Racism Test. Now 
What?, NPR (Aug. 4, 2015, 8:03 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/08/04/416827667/so-you-flunked-a-
racism-test-now-what [https://perma.cc/6CFG-5TFV] (highlighting the increased 
prevalence of implicit bias discussions in mainstream news and media sources). 
187  Id. 
188  Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2015, at A18. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  Id.  
192  While this Article’s scope is confined to criminal trials, it is important to note 
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not only choose to enter into their professional role, but also serve as the 
tangible face of the justice system.  Additionally, judges play a prominent 
part in influencing trial outcomes through managing the trial, determining the 
admissibility of evidence and appropriateness of certain statements, and 
ultimately rendering the sentencing decision.193  Given judges’ direct 
involvement in each case they hear, problems stemming from biased 
judgments are particularly concerning.  Moreover, the strength of 
stereotypical associations between criminality and race might be even more 
potent in judges than in the general public; since black individuals comprise 
a disproportionately high percentage of the defendant population, judges 
might possess skewed perceptions of criminal trends.194   
The subsequent section outlines two policies for implementing virtual 
reality training among judges, highlighting associated benefits for multiple 
players in the courtroom system.  After addressing possible objections to 
these policies, this section contends that judges should be expected to 
participate in virtual reality training exercises.  In order to simplify the 
following discussion, assume that in the near future, virtual reality methods 
will be effective, targeted in scope, and ready to implement in the courtroom 
setting.   
 
A. Virtual Reality Training: Painting the Picture 
 
Implementing virtual reality training could potentially take one of two 
forms: a voluntary policy or a mandatory policy.  In a voluntary policy, 
judges would be informed about implicit biases in the courtroom and 
provided with information about the virtual reality exercises (including facts 
about the strength, scope, and duration of the training’s effects).195  Judges 
would then have the option to participate in the exercises prior to trials.  
Depending on how long the effects last, judges could perform the exercises 
before opening statements, or potentially during continuing judicial 
education seminars (should the effects be sufficiently durable).  In contrast to 
a voluntary policy, a mandatory process would make virtual reality exercises 
                                                                                                                   
that implicit racial biases are also a concern in civil cases.  See Kang et al., supra 
note 8, at 1152–68. 
193  Id. at 1146. 
194  See Papillon, supra note 67, at 53 (noting the overrepresentation of black 
convicts in the criminal justice system, and the impact of this fact on perceptions of 
black individuals’ propensity to engage in criminal behavior).  
195  In order to avoid any race salience effects that might arise in explaining the 
reason for virtual reality, judges would likely be informed of the problem of implicit 
bias as a general phenomenon.  This instruction should not be viewed as deceptive, 
since even though the exercises are targeted at implicit racial biases in particular, the 
reductions in automatic self-other distinctions are generalizable and impact the 
fundamental processes underlying many types of implicit biases.  
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a requisite aspect of the judicial profession; individuals would not be forced 
to participate in the exercises, but would have to agree to them in order to 
enter or remain in the profession.  Since individuals are not required to 
become judges, this policy will be referred to as “pseudo-compulsory” for 
the remainder of this Article.  Importantly, in either policy, the training 
would serve as a supplemental tool to judicial decision-making (as opposed 
to a technological solution to implicit racial biases), and should accurately be 
portrayed as such when explained to judges.196   
 
B. Benefits of the Policies 
 
In order to appreciate the full benefit of virtual reality training, consider 
the three main parties impacted: (1) the defendant on trial, (2) the justice 
system at large, and (3) the individual judge participating in the training.197  
Starting with defendants, if a judge chooses to engage in the training (and 
assuming it successfully attenuates his implicit racial biases), defendants 
might be more likely to be presumed innocent from the beginning of the 
hearing.  Reducing implicit racial biases would also boost the justice 
system’s legitimacy—by increasing a judge’s capacity to interpret evidence 
in an equitable manner, the justice system could better meet its goal of 
facilitating fair and impartial trials. Plus, if the trial system better fulfilled 
this intended purpose, citizens would be more confident in their likelihood of 
receiving a fair trial should they ever find themselves in the position of a 
defendant.  With respect to the individual judge, participating in virtual 
reality training could conceivably facilitate more adequate compliance with 
professional and legal duties.  Not only is impartiality a professional 
obligation,198 but the inability to be impartial also constitutes legal grounds 
for disqualification from a trial.199  To the extent that individuals derive 
benefits from better performance in their chosen line of work, the judge 
might additionally gain personal satisfaction from more adeptly carrying out 
his role.   
 
                                                 
196  Framing the technology as a supplemental tool was crucial to the success of 
the algorithm-based bail measure discussed in Part IV, supra.  See Dewan, supra 
note 188.   
197  Dewan, supra note 188 (discussing how implicit racial biases can impact 
judges when setting bail, leading to negative impacts on individual defendants, and 
de-legitimatizing the justice system as a whole). 
198  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2–2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
199  28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). 
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C. Potential Objections 
 
Despite the associated benefits, some individuals might consider virtual 
reality programs a controversial proposal.  Specifically, two main concerns 
might arise: freedom of thought and coercion.200 
 
1. Freedom of Thought 
 
Given that the virtual reality exercises target automatic and hardwired 
judgments, one might worry that courts (or the parties responsible for 
designing the paradigms) are “brainwashing” judges—by covertly reducing 
implicit racial biases, virtual reality programs might shift the very way that 
judges view and perceive the world around them.  However, if the exercises 
work as expected, virtual reality training should not be conceptualized as a 
brainwashing phenomenon.  By asking people to view their avatar in a 
mirror, or explore a mundane virtual setting, the exercises are not implanting 
thoughts into individuals’ minds, erasing opinions about race, or dictating 
what people should believe.201  Given that explicit beliefs are often 
inconsistent with one’s implicit biases,202 it is highly unlikely that the 
exercises would alter the judge’s personality, attitudes, or opinions.203  Yet, 
even if the exercises would not “brainwash” judges, virtual reality would 
influence the nature or likelihood of making certain automatic judgments.  
As a result, the more fundamental question might concern freedom of 
thought and the interference with a judge’s underlying mental processes.   
While freedom of thought merits respect, there are two counterarguments 
to note.  First, multiple scholars contend that automatic processes, like 
implicit biases or impulses, actually decrease one’s capacity for mental 
control, particularly when these biases diverge from one’s explicit 
                                                 
200  See infra Parts IV.C.1, IV.C.2. 
201  Not only does the design of these exercises avoid portraying any explicit 
message, but the mechanisms driving the effects are also primarily based on bottom-
up sensory perception, as opposed to top-down executive processing.  See Lara 
Maister & Manos Tsakiris, The Plasticity of Self-Other Boundaries: From Body 
Ownership to Social Cognition, in 2 CONCEPTUAL AND INTERACTIVE EMBODIMENT: 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMBODIED COGNITION 178–82 (Martin H. Fischer & Yann Coello 
eds., 2015) (discussing neural mechanisms underlying body ownership illusions, 
highlighting the influence of somatosensory and motor mirror systems). 
202  Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 57–58. 
203  By reducing self-other distinctions, it is possible that the opinions or attitudes 
of those who are explicitly racist might be modulated to some degree.  In other 
words, for those whose implicit and explicit biases do not align, attenuating implicit 
biases could potentially have an impact on the strength of the explicit bias.  Even if 
this were the case, these individuals would theoretically have already been removed 
from the judiciary as a result of their explicit prejudice. 
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attitudes.204  By clouding a person’s ability to thoroughly exercise his 
consciously held beliefs or opinions, implicit biases can impair freedom of 
thought and autonomous decision-making in their own right.205  Second, 
under both voluntary and pseudo-compulsory policies, judges would have to 
agree to participate in the training, knowing that it modulates mental 
processes to some degree.  If judges make an informed choice to do so, then 
respecting freedom of thought and autonomy simultaneously entails honoring 
judges’ decisions.206  Considering the nature of the exercises and the 
volitional facet of the policies, virtual reality training should not be 




When evaluating the policies’ respect for freedom of thought, 
particularly in the pseudo-compulsory case, critics might raise the question of 
coercion; namely, would judges truly be making an unburdened, autonomous 
decision to participate in the training?  The short answer to this question is 
“yes.”  Coercion typically entails three main criteria: (1) reducing an 
individual’s available choices, (2) negatively impacting the individual and 
depriving him of something to which he is entitled, and (3) intentionally 
manipulating the individual to achieve a certain outcome.207 The pseudo-
compulsory policy fails to meet any of these elements. 
Starting with the first requirement (reducing available options), one 
could claim that the judge’s choice set has been limited: whereas current or 
aspiring judges previously had the option to serve without agreeing to the 
training, this choice is no longer available.  However, it is not entirely clear 
that a judge’s choice set has been narrowed as opposed to merely 
complicated through additional conditions.  Remember that professions 
contain a set of requirements with which members must comply, and failure 
to meet such obligations bars individuals from entering or remaining in that 
occupation.208  Consequently, the choice set for judges can be viewed as (a) 
                                                 
204  Bublitz, supra note 84, at 9; Thomas Douglas, Moral Enhancement, 25 J. 
APPLIED PHIL. 228, 231 (2008). 
205  Bublitz, supra note 84, at 9; Douglas, supra note 204, at 231. 
206  See 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO 
SELF 43 (1986) (noting that autonomy involves making decisions for oneself, 
including being responsible for consequences that ensue as a result of the decision). 
207  ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202–21 (1987); Jennifer S. Hawkins & 
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Clarifying Confusions about Coercion, 35 HASTINGS CENTER 
REP. 16, 17 (2005).  
208  See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“The 
Canons state overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must observe. 
Although a judge may be disciplined only for violating a Rule, the Canons provide 
important guidance in interpreting the Rules”). 
150       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1 
 
 
comply with the obligations required for the profession or (b) lose your 
qualification to hold this position.  Although the stipulations have changed 
under the pseudo-compulsory policy, this overall option set stays the same.   
Whether or not we believe that options have been reduced, the more 
questionable claims are that judges are worse off as a result of the policy, and 
that they have been deprived of something to which they are entitled (i.e., the 
second requirement for coercion).209  In the case of judges currently sitting 
on the bench, one might argue that making them resign from their position 
for failure to consent to the training would have a negative impact on their 
lives; they would lose their job, their financial security, their self-identity, 
and the ability to work in a role about which they might be fervently 
passionate.  For those aspiring to enter the profession, withholding their 
consent and forfeiting their eligibility might undermine all of the effort and 
resources that these individuals had invested in order to one day have the 
opportunity to serve as a judge.  Although these consequences might exist, it 
seems strange to afford them much weight.  These “negative” impacts 
concern infringing upon an individual’s interest in being a judge; yet, the 
virtual reality exercises would enable judges to better perform their jobs, 
uphold fundamental values of the position, and theoretically promote the 
very interest in question.  Regardless, the pseudo-compulsory policy would 
not deprive judges of a right.  There is no right to be a judge, let alone to 
have any particular job. Moreover, as stated earlier, every profession contains 
a set of rules that its members are expected to follow, simply by virtue of 
being in that profession.  Judges choose to accept these obligations, and 
would only be faced with this pseudo-compulsory decision if they voluntarily 
elected to join the judiciary, which is something they are in no way 
compelled to do, nor are entitled to do.210 
Moving to the third element of coercion (manipulative intent), one could 
theoretically contend that the government creates this restrictive choice set 
for the sole purpose of facilitating its desired outcome.  Assuming that judges 
have a strong interest in keeping their positions, they might consent to the 
exercises (even against their preferred wishes) in order to qualify for the 
profession. As a result, these judges would directly perpetuate the 
government’s goals and interests.  However, this argument is tenuous at best.  
While judges might weigh the virtual reality exercises differently than they 
would if the consequence did not entail losing their jobs, the purpose of the 
policy and the intentions behind it are not focused on making judges 
succumb to the government’s desires.  Instead, the policy is designed to 
enhance the fairness of the justice system, create positive benefits for 
                                                 
209  WERTHEIMER, supra note 207, at 202–21; Hawkins & Emanuel, supra note 
207, at 17 (explaining that coercion typically entails the deprivation of an entitlement 
that leaves the coerced party worse off). 
210  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. 
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citizens, and enable judges to more adequately meet their professional and 
legal duties.   
 
D. The Case for a Pseudo-Compulsory System 
 
Thus far, this Article has argued that (a) voluntary and pseudo-
compulsory policies would bring substantial benefits to the courtroom, and 
(b) that both setups could be justifiably implemented.  Although a voluntary 
scheme would constitute a less drastic measure, a pseudo-compulsory system 
should be the ultimate goal for two main reasons: equitable access and 
distributed burdens.  First, a pseudo-compulsory policy enables every 
defendant to access the benefits of bias reduction, not just those who happen 
to be assigned a judge who elected to participate in the training.  Second, if a 
system with less biased judges enhances the legitimacy of both the judiciary 
and the trial process as a whole, only those who engaged in the training 
would be supplying these benefits.  While some judges would be taking on 
an extra burden, those who refused to participate would reap the advantages 
of this fairer trial system without providing the necessary contributions 
themselves.211  Integrating virtual reality training into professional 
requirements through a pseudo-compulsory policy would allocate each judge 
a role in bringing about the policy’s benefits.  Accordingly, while both 
voluntary and pseudo-compulsory policies would improve the status quo, the 
latter more closely aligns with the justice system’s respect for fairness and 
equity.212   
However, since virtual reality training would present a large departure 
from current practice, incremental implementation is advisable.  Courts could 
first introduce training on a voluntary basis, allowing judges sufficient time 
to build familiarity with the exercises.  Once the training programs had a 
                                                 
211  See generally Alan Wertheimer, Liberty, Coercion, and the Limits of the State, 
in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 57 (Robert L. 
Simon ed., 2002) (discussing the Justice Principle and free-riding).   
212  While a pseudo-compulsory policy might sound severe, it is worth noting that 
a similar setup already exists in the medical setting.  Take the case of mandatory 
vaccinations for health care workers, which some states and hospitals currently 
require.  See State Immunization Laws for Healthcare Workers and Patients, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://www2a.cdc.gov/vaccines/statevaccsApp/AdministrationbyPatientType.asp?Pat
ientTypetmp=Hospital%20Employees#1 [https://perma.cc/3QZT-WMZ3] (for a list 
of voluntary and mandatory immunization policies for each state).  The comparison 
between health care workers and judges can be made on multiple levels—health care 
workers choose to enter the profession, have duties to protect and serve both 
individuals and the broader public, professional obligations require them to take 
certain actions that prevent harm to patients and the health care system at large, and 
finally, failure to comply with such requirements compromises their ability to 
adequately perform their job.   
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chance to gain traction, courts could then transition to pseudo-compulsory 
policies.  Even though voluntary approaches are not ideal for the reasons 
mentioned above, obtaining internal support among the judiciary is crucial 
for the program’s ultimate success, and any reduction in implicit racial bias 
would be an improvement over the present system.   
  
 V.  VIRTUAL REALITY AND JURIES 
 
While the judiciary is a sensible starting point for bias reduction training, 
judges are not the only population in the courtroom setting affected by 
implicit racial biases.  As mentioned in Part I, studies with mock jurors 
highlight the strong influence that biases can have on interpretations of 
information and evaluations of guilt.213  In contrast to the argument for 
judges, the analysis for jurors is significantly more complicated given the 
unique characteristics and protections afforded to juries.214  Additionally, 
cultural acceptance of training policies might be more difficult to achieve 
since jury service is not an optional duty,215 and logistical barriers might arise 
considering the size of juries (as compared to a single judge).216  
Nevertheless, given the prevalence and impact of implicit racial biases, it is 
worth extending the analysis to the jury, one of the most influential decision-
making groups in the courtroom setting.  The subsequent section follows a 
similar framework to the discussion of judges, explaining what the respective 
policies might look like, addressing relevant benefits and potential concerns, 
and analyzing the unique demands of the juror role. 
 
A. Virtual Reality Training Policies 
 
As with judges, virtual reality training with jurors could be voluntary or 
pseudo-compulsory.  In a voluntary scheme, upon being summoned for jury 
service, potential jurors would be informed of the problem of implicit biases 
                                                 
213  Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1142–52; Larson, supra note 10, at 154–58; 
Levinson et al., supra note 39, at 207; Levinson & Young, supra note 53, at 344–45; 
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 220–21. 
214  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606 (explaining protected status of jury’s deliberative 
process, noting that jurors cannot testify about their conversations or the thought 
processes involved in their decision); ANDREW G. FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY 
MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 12–21 (2013) (noting 
the special and distinct nature of jury service). 
215  28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012). 
216  For example, completing the virtual reality training with each juror before trial 
might take longer than completing the exercises with a single judge, and larger 
quantities of the necessary equipment would likely be required as well.  While this is 
by no means a complete list of potential logistical factors, a full analysis of the 
practical considerations is beyond the scope of this Article.   
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in the courtroom and given facts about virtual reality exercises.  Jurors would 
then have the option to participate in the training prior to the start of the trial, 
and could potentially perform the exercises while waiting to be called for 
voir dire,217 as a supplement to the orientation videos that jurors are already 
expected to watch.218  A pseudo-compulsory policy, on the other hand, would 
make the exercises a requisite aspect of jury service.  In order to only 
conduct voir dire with those who could actually meet the requirements of the 
juror role, potential jurors would be given the option to consent to the 
training prior to the jury selection process.  Only those jurors who agreed to 
the training would continue with voir dire, and if selected would partake in 
the exercises before the trial commenced.  However, to prevent virtual reality 
training from simply providing an easy excuse to avoid serving, individuals 
who declined to give their consent would be required to fulfill some other 
civic duty.219   
 
B. Benefits of the Policies 
 
Mirroring the argument for judges, a juror’s choice to participate in the 
training confers benefits to the defendant on trial, the justice system at large, 
and the juror participating in the exercises.  By reducing their implicit racial 
biases, jurors would help facilitate a defendant’s right to a fair trial, promote 
the presumption of innocence, and enable the justice system to better meet its 
intended purpose.  Moreover, since jurors are required to hear cases 
impartially,220 virtual reality exercises would allow individuals to better 
                                                 
217  Ideally, jurors would be asked to make their decision prior to voir dire so that 
their choice to participate would not be influenced by the jury selection process.  
Otherwise, if the willingness to consent to participate was a subject during voir dire, 
potential jurors might be swayed to answer in a manner counter to their actual 
preferences.  Returning to the social desirability effects mentioned in Part I, potential 
jurors might give their consent when asked in the presence of the attorneys and judge 
in order to conform to what they believe is expected from them.  Alternatively, one 
could also imagine that potential jurors might decline to give their consent when 
asked during voir dire solely as a strategy to get out of jury service.  Requiring a 
decision before voir dire might circumvent these issues.   
218  See JODY GEORGE ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., HANDBOOK ON JURY USE IN 
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 63–64 (1989) (describing the orientation process, 
including the frequent use of videos).   
219  The exact nature of this civic duty is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
some safeguards would be necessary to prevent virtual reality exercises from 
becoming a pretense for not serving for reasons separate from the training exercises 
themselves. 
220  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed”); 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (2012) (“any person summoned for jury 
service may be . . . excluded by the court on the ground that such person may be 
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perform their civic and legal duties.   
While both voluntary and pseudo-compulsory schemes would achieve 
these benefits, the same arguments introduced in Part IV.D apply to jurors.  
With a pseudo-compulsory policy, all members of all juries would have 
attenuated implicit racial biases (at least to some degree).  Compared to a 
voluntary policy, a pseudo-compulsory system would ensure each defendant 
access to a less biased jury, and could potentially produce greater reductions 
in overall bias—having 12 less partial jurors is conceivably more desirable 
than having only a select few (depending on how many jurors decided to 
participate in the voluntary scheme).  A pseudo-compulsory system would 
also distribute the burdens more equally across jurors, and perhaps across the 
citizenry in general (given that jury service is a mandatory civic duty).221  
And so, while both policies could facilitate more impartial trials, a pseudo-
compulsory policy would likely deliver greater benefits.  Nevertheless, as 
argued in Part IV.D, a voluntary policy would be a desirable starting place to 
incrementally build momentum and support for the training before 
transitioning to pseudo-compulsory requirements. 
 
C. Potential Objections 
 
In addition to freedom of thought and coercion, one might also worry 
about the representativeness of the jury (e.g., obtaining a jury of one’s peers 
and a fair cross-section of the community).222  Although the analysis for 
freedom of thought is largely identical to the argument put forth for judges, 
the latter two issues (representativeness of the jury and coercion) present 
unique considerations in the jury context.   
 
1. A Representative Jury 
 
Within the issue of representation, there are two similar but distinct 
questions.  First, would the virtual reality exercises, by reducing implicit 
racial biases, modulate jurors in such a way that they no longer qualify as a 
defendant’s “peers”?  Second, is there a certain type of individual who is 
more likely to consent to the exercises, thereby diminishing the likelihood of 
obtaining a fair cross-section of the community?223 
With respect to the first question, it is highly unlikely that virtual reality 
training would create a “superclass” of potential jurors.  As mentioned in the 
discussion on freedom of thought,224 the exercises would not fundamentally 
                                                                                                                   
unable to render impartial jury service”).  
221  28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (describing jury service as a mandatory civic duty). 
222  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). 
223  Id. 
224  See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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alter personalities or opinions,225 especially given that implicit racial biases 
often diverge from individuals’ consciously held beliefs.226  Further, it is 
unlikely that the virtual reality techniques would wholly eliminate biases,227 
let alone reduce all jurors’ biases to the exact same level.   
While the law does not explicitly define the term “peer,” the Supreme 
Court has linked the notion to citizenship,228 and declared that juries must 
represent a fair cross-section of a defendant’s contemporary, local 
community.229  Yet, as the Supreme Court has stated, there is “no 
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and 
reflect the various distinctive groups in the population.  Defendants are not 
entitled to a jury of any particular composition.”230  Returning to the context 
in question, most people in the population possess at least some level of 
implicit racial bias, and the extent of this bias can vary from one person to 
the next.231  While jurors who participate in the virtual reality training might 
exhibit lower levels of bias on average, the law does not require juries to 
mimic the precise distribution of personal characteristics within a 
community.232  As a result, even if jurors differ from members of their 
community with respect to implicit racial biases, they would almost certainly 
still qualify as a defendant’s “peers” according to the Supreme Court’s 
conceptualization of the term.233 
Moving to the second question, it seems equally far-fetched that only a 
select type of individual would agree to participate in the exercises.  One 
might worry, for example, about age groups, since people from younger 
generations tend to be more accepting of new technologies,234 and are likely 
                                                 
225  This argument assumes that the individuals in question do not hold explicitly 
racist beliefs.  While it is possible that the virtual reality exercises could modulate 
racist attitudes by reducing self-other distinctions, individuals with explicit racial 
prejudice should have already been removed from the jury pool during voir dire.  
226  Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 57–58. 
227  See Amodio, supra note 26, at 679 (discussing the incredibly hardwired nature 
of implicit racial biases and their inability to be completely unlearned). 
228  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (“The very idea of a jury 
is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is 
selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, 
persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds”).  
229  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).  
230  Id. at 538. 
231  Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 58.  
232  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. 
233  Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 (explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the term “peer”).  
234  Pew Res. Ctr., Millennials: Confident. Connected. Open to Change, 13, 26 
(2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-
connected-open-to-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/X59H-KVYB]. 
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more experienced with, or interested in, virtual reality in particular.235  Yet, 
virtual reality is becoming so commonplace that anyone with a New York 
Times print subscription has likely heard of virtual reality and owns a Google 
Cardboard headset.236  But beyond the technological aspects of virtual 
reality, individuals from older generations might simply feel a stronger 
impetus to fulfill their civic duty and participate on a jury.237  The bottom 
line is that many factors will likely guide individuals’ acceptance of virtual 
reality exercises and motivations to participate in the training.  It therefore 
seems reasonable to expect that a fair cross-section of the community would 




Among the list of potential concerns, coercion might present the most 
pressing issue.  As noted in the previous section,238 coercion typically 
involves three main aspects: (1) a reduced set of options, (2) an adverse 
deprivation of something to which an individual is entitled, and (3) 
manipulative intent by the agent creating the choice.239  Compared to the 
situation with judges, critics could make a more compelling case for viewing 
a pseudo-compulsory system with jurors as coercive.  However, the 
following section contends that even if we decide the policy contains 
coercive elements, the policy should not be considered problematic. 
Starting with the first criterion, one could argue that since a potential 
juror under the pseudo-compulsory scheme no longer has the option of 
serving without participating in the training, an option has been taken away 
from her.  Yet, as with the case of judges, this Article suggests that a juror’s 
set of available choices has not been reduced, but instead modulated with 
additional conditions.  In the existing system, if selected for the jury, 
individuals essentially have two choices—serve or face consequences of 
monetary fines or potential arrest.240  With the proposed policy, jurors have a 
                                                 
235  Here’s How Gaming Will Fuel Rapid Growth in the Virtual Reality Market, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 22, 2015, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/gaming-will-fuel-the-virtual-reality-market-2015-5 
[https://perma.cc/3NAD-49UR].  
236  Robertson, supra note 184. 
237  See Associated Press, 5 Things About Americans’ Slipping Sense of Civic 
Duty, N.Y. POST (Dec. 29, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/12/29/5-things-
about-americans-slipping-sense-of-civic-duty/ [https://perma.cc/A2HB-5VER] 
(noting that younger generations feel less compelled by a sense of civic duty than 
older generations).  
238  See supra Section IV.C.2. 
239  WERTHEIMER, supra note 207, at 202–21; Hawkins & Emanuel, supra note 
207, at 17.  
240  28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012). 
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more complicated set of options.  A potential juror could choose to (a) 
consent to the training and serve if selected; (b) consent to the training, 
refuse to serve if selected, and subsequently face the same punitive 
ramifications as in the existing system; (c) not provide consent to the 
training, forfeit the opportunity to serve if selected, and fulfill some 
alternative civic duty instead; or (d) not provide consent to the training, 
forfeit the opportunity to serve, refuse to fulfill the alternative civic duty, and 
face punitive consequences.   
If we entertain the idea that an option set has been constrained, the 
question of whether it has been constrained in an inherently detrimental way 
depends on whether a juror has a right to serve.241  Although a few legal 
provisions come close, there does not appear to be an explicit legal right to 
jury service.  All citizens have a right to “have the opportunity to be 
considered for service;”242 yet, the right to be considered is not equivalent to 
the right to actually serve, and the opportunity to be summoned (which this 
provision seems to encapsulate)243 is different than the opportunity to be 
selected.  Next, while the Supreme Court has acknowledged a right to not be 
excluded from service for reasons such as race,244 a positive right to serve has 
never been officially pronounced.245  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
recognized states’ abilities to set “relevant qualifications” for juror 
eligibility.246  The willingness to participate in virtual reality training could 
plausibly be considered a relevant factor, since impartiality is a core tenet of 
the jury system.  Nevertheless, some scholars assert that a right to serve is 
implicit in other rights, such as the right to vote, or First Amendment rights 
protecting civic participation.247  Whether or not such arguments actually 
establish a legal right to serve, they seem to imply a moral right or privilege 
to serve.  According to this line of thinking, citizens might be tacitly entitled 
                                                
241  WERTHEIMER, supra note 207, at 202–21 (explaining that coercion entails 
being deprived of something to which one is entitled). 
242  28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). 
243  Id. (“It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the 
opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts 
of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned 
for that purpose”).  
244  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402–11 (1991).  
245  Interestingly, an American Bar Association paper cites Powers v. Ohio as 
articulating a legal right of all citizens to serve on juries, despite the fact that the 
actual opinion does not support such a claim.  See ABA Comm’n on the Am. Jury 
Project, ABA Principles for Juries and Jury Trial, 11 (2005), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/american_jury/fi
nal_commentary_july_1205.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/V73R-TM99]. 
246  Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Green Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 332–33 (1970). 
247  AKHIL R. AMAR & ALAN R. HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE 
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 61–63 (1999); FERGUSON, supra 
note 214, at 12–21. 
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to have the opportunity to serve as a function of their membership in 
society—jury service allows citizens to contribute to the societal and legal 
framework under which they operate on a daily basis, and upholds 
fundamental Constitutional values that comprise a democratic nation.248   
The third prong of the coercion definition, manipulation, seems the most 
difficult to contend.249  The intent of a pseudo-compulsory policy is to 
increase the fairness of the trial system, not to make jurors do something 
against their will.  However, given that jury service is mandatory if an 
individual is selected, and that citizens might have a strong desire to 
participate in the justice system, one could argue that the government, by 
instituting a pseudo-compulsory policy, is exploiting the interests of jurors to 
advance its own goals.   
Even if we accept that the pseudo-compulsory policy contains coercive 
elements (although this Article has posited multiple reasons to doubt such a 
position), not all individuals would necessarily be coerced into agreeing to 
the virtual reality training.  For instance, some individuals might lack a 
strong interest in serving.  Given that many citizens attempt to get out of jury 
service and view it as an unpleasant burden,250 the idea that some individuals 
would uninhibitedly choose to waive a “moral right” to service seems 
reasonable or even predictable.  Additionally, other individuals might 
actively desire to participate in the virtual reality exercises, and thus would 
not be pressured into making the decision to do so.  That being said, consent 
might be undermined in individuals who harbor a strong interest in serving, 
but possess qualms about the exercises.  Yet, although coercion is a serious 
issue, this particular case does not seem especially problematic.  Jurors are 
required to impartially hear the case before them. If an individual has a 
substantial interest in engaging in the justice system through this civic duty, 
then the policy would be furthering the interests of this individual—the 
policy advances the goals that jury service entails, and allows jurors to better 
meet their required duties.  In other words, if the exercises work as expected, 
it seems counterintuitive that a potential juror would have a strong interest in 
serving but be averse to the training.   
Accordingly, although freedom of thought, representativeness, and 
coercion each deserve legitimate discussion, this Article suggests that none 
of these objections actually undermine the proposal in question.   
 
                                                 
248  AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 247, at 61-63; FERGUSON, supra note 214, at 18–
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249  Hawkins & Emanuel, supra note 207, at 17 (explaining that coercion typically 
involves an element of manipulation). 
250  AMAR  & HIRSCH, supra note 247, at 62. 
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D. Civic Duties and the Demands of the Role 
 
Beyond arguing that virtual reality training with jurors would be 
justifiable, this Article suggests that jurors should be expected to participate 
in the training exercises.  The system of trial by jury affords citizens a 
remarkably important role in society.  Individuals are asked to decide matters 
that could completely change the course of another citizen’s life. While jury 
duty is mandatory for those eligible,251 it is also an opportunity for citizens to 
partake in a democratic process, and promote the values and liberties central 
to the Constitution.252  But, if we are to champion the importance of the jury 
and its role in preserving a democratic society, then we also have to 
acknowledge that jury service is a duty that entails certain requirements.  If 
jurors are not impartial, they cannot adequately uphold the values of fairness 
and the presumption of innocence that the justice system and democracy 
demand.  And so, even though jurors do not actively choose to contribute to 
the justice system in the way that judges do, they should still be expected to 
fulfill their roles to the best of their ability.   
Importantly, the law already has a set of standards in place to prevent 
those deemed incapable of fulfilling their duties from serving.253  For 
instance, individuals considered too young, with insufficient English 
language fluency, with certain mental disabilities, or with obvious conflicts 
of interest are all ineligible for service.254  Moreover, during the trial period, 
jurors are prohibited from speaking to each other at specific times about 
certain topics, their freedom of movement may be restricted, and their access 
to various sources of information may be limited.255  These regulations 
reflect an expectation that jurors not only perform their civic duty, but also 
perform it well.  If virtual reality training enables jurors to reduce implicit 
racial biases and engage in more impartial decision-making, then it seems 




Our criminal justice system places substantial value on fairness and the 
presumption of innocence.  A plethora of rules and protections exist to 
prevent the conviction of an innocent individual, even at the cost of 
potentially acquitting a guilty perpetrator.256  For example, the burden of 
                                                 
251  28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012). 
252  AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 247, at 61–63; FERGUSON, supra note 214, at 
21–22; GREENE & HEILBRUN, supra note 6, at 297. 
253  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c). 
254  28 U.S.C. § 1865(b).  
255  ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 134, at 10–14. 
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proof is on the prosecution,257 the threshold for a guilty verdict is beyond a 
reasonable doubt,258 defendants are guaranteed the right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury,259 and Constitutional amendments emphasize due process 
during trials.260  While this framework is revered for promoting a transparent 
and just system, the prevalence and impact of implicit racial biases in the 
courtroom serve to undermine the realization of these values and standards.  
If black defendants tend to be automatically associated with guilt, 
criminality, and threat on a subconscious level, especially by those in 
influential decision-making positions, it becomes impossible to truly achieve 
the requirements of impartiality and the presumption of innocence.   
In light of the persisting impact of implicit racial bias in the courtroom, 
this Article has put forth an unconventional and novel approach in the search 
for a solution.  While much research remains to be conducted, virtual reality 
exercises have the potential to reduce implicit racial biases more effectively 
than measures proposed in existing literature. If virtual reality proves 
sufficiently effective, this Article has suggested policies for implementation, 
arguing that virtual reality training should become a justifiable expectation 
among both judges and jurors.  However, even if virtual reality mechanisms 
do not live up to their potential, the discussion of virtual reality in the 
courtroom is still a fruitful endeavor.  If nothing else, such a proposition 
should inspire further conversation about the use of innovative methods for 
curbing implicit racial biases.  Virtual reality training might not be the 
ultimate answer, but it deserves serious consideration. 
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